The standard Bayesian recipe for selecting the rational choice is presented. A familiar example in which the recipe fails to produce any definite result is introduced. It is argued that a generalization of Gärdenfors' and Sahlin's theory of unreliable probabilities -which itself does not guarantee a solution to the problem -offers the best available approach. But a number of challenges to this approach are also presented and discussed.
Let us suppose that a person called Mary, who likes to carefully and methodically ponder all her decisions, goes to the furniture store to purchase a new couch. And let us suppose, to keep things from getting unnecessarily knotty, that she has trimmed her options down to three. Couch A is very cute and stylish but (not surprisingly) rather uncomfortable and pricey. Couch B is not so stylish, but it is more comfortable than couch A, and its price is average. Couch C is by far the most comfortable of all three couches, and it is a bargain. Its design, however, leaves much to be desired. Mary knows that, depending on whether she settles on design, price or comfort as her priority, her ordinal preference ordering will be different (Table 1) . But the problem, of course, is that none of these attributes stand alone before her as the sole priority. Now, the question of interest in this article is this: What should rational people do in order to solve such a choice problem rationally, as opposed to simply rely on chance or blind impulse? What should rational people do, that is, to rationally reconcile conflicting preference orderings? I will first introduce the standard Bayesian recipe for selecting the rational choice, which provides nowadays the canonical answer to this question, and then examine some related but much less studied issues that arise when some of the available choice options involve -more or less -unreliable probabilities.
Design as priority
Couch A  couch B  couch C Price as priority Couch C  couch B  couch A Comfort as priority Couch C  couch B  couch A Table 1 The standard Bayesian recipe for selecting the rational choice goes essentially like this. We must first identify those attributes that either increase or decrease the desirability of each single competing option. In our case, I think it is safe to assume that our previous attributes almost invariably determine our choices -other attributes like (say) size, color, and manufacturer's name being equal -when buying a new couch: comfort M, design D, and price P 1 . Second, standard Bayesianism asks us to ascribe cardinal utilities (invariant in their representational properties up to a positive affine transformation) to all individual attributes associated with each single competing alternative. In the simplest of cases, we can assume that such allocations correspond to single real scalars, rather than continuous functionswe will get to the latter case, which is by and large the standard in the context of science and engineering, below 2 . We can assume, for example, that Mary gives couch A, B, and C the following scorecards: Table 2 And third, we are required to associate a scaling value, which represents how strongly we want (or dislike) each single attribute against all others, to all individual attributes. Let us assume, in line with the assumption above that none of the attributes are her sole priority, the following scaling values k for M, D, and P according to Mary: Table 3 Provided this, and provided that we are still dealing with a situation where the subjective probability measure defined over the possible states of the world is assumed to be either 0 or 1 (i.e., a situation extreme variability of parameters like mass, elasticity, thermal conductivity, and so on, which determine the value of such attributes), single attribute utilities are usually introduced as (often continuous) functions. In order for this article to be of relevance not only to philosophers but to anyone with an interest in decision theory in its most diverse applications, I will consider later on the most general formulation of the issues, of which the aforementioned examples are only special cases.
of epistemic certainty where no other probabilities are involved), we are finally asked by the Bayesian to determine the overall utility of A, B, and C simply by adding all single attribute utility measures, factorized by the corresponding scaling values, allotted by Mary to each individual attribute M, D, and P of A, B, and C. Table 4 This is, in a nutshell, what the standard Bayesian recipe would ask of rational epistemic agents that, in a context of certainty, are struggling to come up with a resolution to their choice problem 3 . In our present case, this recipe would tell us that, in spite of the fact that A is the maximally stylish couch and C is the maximally comfortable and least expensive couch, the rational option is actually B -the option which maximizes overall utility. Now, it is easy to see, even in such a simple case like this, that much depends on how the single attribute utility measures and scaling values are respectively distributed by the agents. There exist competing lottery methods whose object is precisely to offer an accurate framework for assessing what utility measure and scaling value corresponds to each single attribute, and for aggregating such measures when many epistemic agents are involved 4 . 4 The possibility of aggregating individual utilities is often countered with skeptical arguments -such as the 'zero-point utility' and 'unit of utility' argumentswhich maintain, roughly, that inter-subjective comparisons of utilities are, in general, meaningless -they claim, in a word, that no co-ordinatization of the utility-space, and no metric system for this space, can be objectively singled out among all possible options. It is such reluctance to consider inter-subjective comparisons of utilities, explicitly rejected by Arrow, what makes the Impossibility Before we illustrate this point, let me introduce the most general (under epistemic certainty) form of this Bayesian recipe, whereby any finite number n of attributes is involved, and all single attribute utilities are continuous functions rather than scalars.
For independent single utilities, the overall utility of each competing choice (in a context, again, of certainty) is determined from 5 : [1] where X is the vector of single attributes x 1 , x 2 , …, x n associated with the choice option in question, u i (x i ) is the single attribute utility function for attribute x i , k i is the scaling value of single attribute x i , and K is a normalizing constant derived from k i , where
There exist, as noted, distinct lottery methods for plotting the values of u i (x i ) and k i . One such method consists, roughly, in asking all agents to imagine that two competing options are being considered, each alike in every respect except one: the attribute level x j for the 'certain' option is known with certainty to be (say) 24 while x j for the 'lottery' option has (say) a 60% probability p of being x j max = 30 (maximal utility) and a 40% probability 1 -p of being x j min = 20 (minimal utility) 6 . The agent is then asked: 'Which option do you prefer: the certain option, the lottery option, or are you indifferent?'. If she responds 'The certain option' the value of x j is decreased (increased) to a less desirable level that is half-way between 24 and 20 (or half-way between 24 and 30, if x j 's desirability goes down when x j goes up). The agent is again required to express her preference, and if the lottery option is now preferred, the value of x j is increased until the decision maker is indifferent between the 'certain' option and the 'lottery' option. A point on the single attribute utility function u j (x j ) is plotted as p u j (x j max ) + (1 -p) u j (x j min ) when such indifference Theorem's disturbing results in social choice theory a demanding challenge for the Bayesian -see Arrow (1950; 1963) , Sen 1970 , Suzumura 1983 5 I follow here, and later, Keeney & Raiffa 1976, chapter 6. 6 As noted before, attributes must not necessarily be quantitative. The same procedure (though slightly more cumbersome, given that scalars often provide a more extensive and fine-grained spectrum of choices) would apply if the relevant attributes were evaluated in terms of a qualitative scale, like (say) the descriptor scale mentioned before: excellent, good, fair, and so forth.
points are reached. And the procedure is iterated for different ps until the entire function, or at least the function within some interval of interest, is sufficiently outlined. Similar types of lottery questions are employed for plotting the levels of k i 7 . One more technical ingredient before we get to our problem. So far we have been dealing with a choice problem in a context of certainty. It is common in the decision-theoretic literature, despite frequent terminological discrepancies that still muddle many discussions, to distinguish between decision problems in a context of: (i) certainty, (ii) risk, (iii) uncertainty and (iv) ignorance. A choice problem under risk is assumed to involve non-trivial (i.e., other than 0 and 1) subjective probability measures over the possible states of the world. And such probability measures are taken to be fully reliable. Choice problems under uncertainty and ignorance, in contrast, are considered to be, respectively, those whereby the probability distributions are either unreliable -and the measure of such unreliability is determined differently in different theories of unreliable probabilities 8 -or completely unknown. I will now introduce a slightly different decision problem regarding couch A, B and C. And I will incorporate probabilities into it. In doing so, I will set forth the problem involving unreliable probabilities that I want to discuss in the remainder of this article. But let us first upgrade equation [1] . For independent single utilities, the overall expected utility of each alternative choice is determined from: [2] where everything is as before, and f i (x i ) is the probability density function correlated with attribute x i . For all choice problems under 7 See Keeney & Raiffa 1976 , chapters 4 and 5. For a detailed description of one of the first computational models developed to carry out these procedures, see Thurston 1991. 8 Three of the major theories are due to Ellsberg 1961 , Levi (1974 1982; 1986) , and Gärdenfors & Sahlin 1982a , reprinted in 1988 . Earlier theories can be found in Wald 1950 and Hurwicz 1951 . And alternative approaches can be found in Skyrms 1980 , Kaplan 1983 , Sahlin 1983 , and Baron 1987 . For more recent theories, with emphasis on the implementation in science and technology and their main focus on fuzzy sets, see Dubois & Prade 1988 , Dubois, Prade & Yager 1996 , Antonsson 2001 .
is assumed to be completely reliable. But for problems under uncertainty (and, of course, ignorance), this assumption does not hold. How are these probabilities obtained in the first place? Bayesian decision theory is based on subjective probabilities. So we start out with a set probability measures defined (in principle) over all possible states of the world. Such initial probability measures may indeed be arbitrary. But new information -arising, for example, from new observations -will adjust the original measures so that they converge toward an 'objective' distribution, as established by de Finetti's famous Representation Theorem 9 . In practical applications of Bayesianism, it is also routine to supplement such so-called 'judgmental information' with statistical estimates 10 , for which different methods exist which determine goodness-of-fit of probability distributions given the available statistical data -the most recognized of such methods being Chi-square, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and AndersonDarling. A problem with the statistical approach, however, which compromises the probabilistic assignments the Bayesian makes from hard data, is that different goodness-of-fit methods occasionally prescribe different probability distributions to exactly the same data. This is referred to in the literature as the 'distribution arbitrariness problem' 11 . In this paper, I will just ignore this problem. Let us get back now to the furniture store example. Imagine that Mary, following the standard Bayesian recipe, has finally settled on couch B. Now she faces the final, and maybe most challenging, decision problem. She is informed that couch B is manufactured at two different locations: Ψ-town and Φ-town. It is of the utmost importance that couch B be delivered precisely on timesay, June 1 st -for Mary is about to embark on a very long tripon, say, June 2 nd -and the couch must be necessarily in place before she departs. She is informed, in addition, that the factory in Ψ-town delivers on time -statistically -50% of the time. That is, provided a long sample of cases (seventy years of work, with hundreds of deliveries per year), roughly 50% of those deliveries were right on time 12 . Finally, Mary is informed that the factory in Φ-town delivers on time 100% of the time when they do not have old pending orders but 0% of the time -that is, no timely deliveries at all -whenever there is a backlog 13 . And there is no available information whatsoever regarding whether they presently have a backlog or not -and, as most readers familiar with furniture dealers and manufacturers will understand, they are not at all responsive to phone calls or emails. Mary has, yet again, settled on couch B. So she must now choose rationally -and by that we mean that she must choose so as to promote her goals, for we still follow here the old Humean notion of instrumental rationality inherent to Bayesianism 14 -in such a way that, given all she knows, couch B has the most chances of being delivered on time. does not yet have a universally accepted solution. I will now briefly offer my own solution, which is a generalization of Gärdenfors' and Sahlin's well-known theory of unreliable probabilities -which itself, given its reliance on minimal satisfactory levels of epistemic reliability, which in turn determine the set of probability distributions from which the MMEU criterion maximizes minimal expected utility, does not guarantee a solution to the problem 17 . And I will then say why this solution, which (to my mind) is the best available approach, may not yet be entirely satisfactory. 'paradox of ideal evidence', although the paradox was discovered by Peirce himself. It shows, in a word, that a strict Bayesian should be as inclined to believe that the next toss of a fair coin is going to yield heads as she is to believe that the next toss of an entirely unknown coin is going to yield heads, which is evidently unwarranted. And see Ellsberg (1961: 653-654) for the introduction of his famous paradox, to which we will return later. 17 If, for example, the degrees of reliability of the 50% chance of timely delivery from Ψ-town and Φ-town both fell below such minimal satisfactory level of reliability, then Gärdenfors' and Sahlin's theory would as well be silent with respect to what choice, either placing the order in Ψ-town or Φ-town, is to be preferred. This minimal satisfactory level of reliability, still, could be viewed as a fluid parameter, so that the context dictates its value -and it conveniently does so in a way that it is always below the threshold of reliability of some probability. But the catch now would be, I think, that the resulting theory is hardly normative, for we now allow this parameter to be a mere reflection of an agent's varying risk appetites (more on this in footnote 23). The reader must remember that Gärdenfors' and Sahlin's decision theory consists of two central moments. First, the decision maker must restrict, provided all competing alternatives in a decision situation, the set of possible probability measures for that situation 'to a set of probability measures I believe, in a word, that the rational response to this choice problem -whether to place the order in Ψ-town or Φ-town -is to place the order in Ψ-town. Why? Because the 50% chance of getting the couch delivered on time that follows from this choice is more reliable (more information, of statistical or judgmental nature, is behind this probabilistic appraisal) than the 50% chance obtained from placing the order in Φ-town. Let us define δ as the real-valued degree of reliability, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, that corresponds to all subjective probability distributions defined over the possible states of the world. In our present case, this amounts to the contention that the 50% chance of timely delivery associated with the choice of placing the order in Ψ-town has a δ 1 measure of reliability, and the 50% chance associated with placing the order in Φ-town has a not necessarily identical δ 2 measure of reliability. And so my previous claim concerning the 50% chance of timely delivery from Ψ-town being more reliable than exactly the same chance of timely delivery from Φ-town amounts now to the simple claim that δ 1 > δ 2 .
What must be shown at this point is that, all other things being equal, higher δ's correspond to higher expected utilities. But is this necessarily the case? My discomfort with the present approach, which has just been insinuated, comes from the realization that, although this is usually the case, it might not always be the case. But let us first explore how higher δ's may correspond at all to higher expected utilities.
The original overall utility of choosing couch B, as opposed to couches A or C, is: [3] where X B is the vector of single attributes x 1 , x 2 , …, x n of choice B. No consideration as to the on-time delivery of couch B is yet included among these attributes.
The overall expected utility of opting for couch B when couch B is manufactured in Ψ-town is:
with a 'satisfactory' degree of epistemic reliability ' (1982a: 369) . Second, the decision maker must apply within this restricted set of probability measures the maximin criterion for expected utilities: she must choose that alternative which has the largest minimal expected utility. For a short description of the theory, see Gärdenfors & Sahlin 1982a , reprinted in 1988 . Criticism can be found in Levi 1982 , with a reply from the authors (Gärdenfors & Sahlin 1982b) , and Levi 1985.
where probability  i = 0.5 if x i = x Ψ and  i = 1 otherwise. The additional attribute of on-time delivery is here represented by x Ψ . The single attribute utility u Ψ (x Ψ ) and scaling value k Ψ are both normalized at 1.
The overall expected utility of choosing couch B if manufactured in Φ-town is: [5] where probability  i = 0.5 if x i = x Φ and  i = 1 otherwise. The additional attribute of on-time delivery is here represented by x Φ . The single attribute utility u Φ (x Φ ) and scaling value k Φ are both normalized, again, at 1. Now, the reader can easily verify that equations [4] and [5] will yield exactly the same result. The utility and scaling values assigned to the attribute of on-time delivery are the same in [4] and [5] . And the probability allocated to such event is also the same (i.e., 0.5) in both equations. And all the remaining parameters are, naturally, the same 18 . This is the reason why these two situations are precisely the same for the standard Bayesian. And this is the reason why it was contended above that the standard Bayesian cannot possibly break the tie between them: for her, these two situations are epistemically indiscernible.
My proposal to break the tie, and therefore to be able to rationally decide between placing the order in Ψ-town or Φ-town, is to incorporate Gärdenfors' and Sahlin's value δ into the equations, although not as a measure of minimal satisfactory degrees of epistemic reliability, which are in turn responsible for artificially setting a cap on what probabilities will actually make it to the utility calculus, but rather as a measure of the reliability of all subjective probabilities defined over the possible states of the world, for epistemic agents a 1 , a 2 ,…, a m at 18 More precisely, all k i except for k Ψ in [4] and k Φ in [5] are 0 at this stage, if we expect the attribute of on-time delivery to be necessary, as stipulated above. I thank one of the referees for pointing this out to me.
19 . When choosing couch B if manufactured in Ψ-town, we obtain as measure of the overall expected utility: [6] where everything is as before and δ i = δ 1 if x i = x Ψ and δ i = 1 otherwise.
The overall expected utility of choosing couch B, on the other hand, when couch B is manufactured in Φ-town is: [7] where everything is as before and δ i = δ 2 if x i = x Φ and δ i = 1 otherwise. But we assumed earlier that δ 1 > δ 2 , for there is statistical information behind  Ψ and no information at all, other than the assumption that backlogs are neither more likely nor less likely in Φ-town than no backlogs, behind  Φ . It follows immediately from this, as readers can confirm by themselves, that E[U(
The rational option is, therefore, to place the order in Ψ-town.
The most general result here, for any finite number n of attributes x 1 , x 2 , …, x n of a choice T open to agents a 1 , a 2 ,…, a m and displaying single independent utility functions u i (x i ), with probability density functions f i (x i ) and reliabilities δ i between 0 and 1, is: [8] The old rule of maximizing expected utility will then determine, as it does in the standard case, that T must be chosen as the rational option 19 This proposal aims not only at capturing the way scientists and engineers deal in reality with probabilistic knowledge, but also providing a decision theory that can be effectively used in everyday practice. It is also worth noting, incidentally, that the analysis presented in this work is strictly static. A fully dynamic analysis ought to consider how the reliability measures are conditionalized on the amount and quality of information as it becomes available to the epistemic agents. The δ's presented here, therefore, are just fixed synchronic slices of an evolving parameter.
if and only if no other available option has either equal or higher overall expected utility 20 . I will now turn to address two concerns that the approach presented in this article immediately brings to mind. The first, which I think is less of a challenge, has to do with the question of how to determine the reliability measure of our probabilities. How is it, in other words, that we can declare with confidence, given what we know, that (say) δ 1 > δ 2 ? And the second concern, insinuated before, has to do with the question of whether higher reliabilities -appraised by whatever means we turn to rely on -do necessarily correspond (all other things being equal) to higher expected utilities. As for the first question, I believe this version of Bayesianism must be explicitly based on a subjective notion of reliabilities (and probabilities), exactly like standard Bayesianism is based on subjective probabilities. It is, I think, for scientists and engineers, and whoever employs the theory, to assess how reliable their probabilities are. And there is in principle no constraint on how to specify such subjective measures 21 . A difficulty though, which also threatens the second-order-probabilities approach to the 'reliability' of probabilities, is that this opens the door to an infinite regress problem: to assess how reliable our measures of reliability are, we need a further measure of reliability gauging how reliable our measures of reliability are, and so on. All epistemic inquiries, however, must stop somewhere, even those of a scientific and technological nature -and more so those involving the trivial task of buying furniture. And, I think, uncovering how reliable our probabilities are looks like a reasonable stopping point. However, decision makers under special circumstances may very well be pragmatically inclined to push further on, and this theory does not preclude them from doing so. 20 There are, of course, different decision criteria for dealing with uncertainty and ignorance -like maximin, maximax, minimax regret, Ellsberg's rule, Levi's test -that transcend the maximizing expected utility rule. In the present theory, however, the only fundamental decision criterion that we need, which may indeed be supplemented by other decision criteria under special circumstances, is that of maximizing overall expected utility. 21 It is likely, for example, that this subjective assessment of reliabilities will be as involved with heuristics and biases as the subjective assessment of probabilities. For a famous analysis of the latter case, see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982. The second problem, I think, is harder to address. It seemed at first obvious to me that the more you know about your probabilities, the better. However, after presenting the ideas contained in this paper to different audiences, it dawned on me that lower δ's might very well correspond to what people often judge as higher expected utilities. When asked about whether you prefer to toss a fair coin (50% chance of winning) or bet on one of two completely unknown horses running against each other (50% chance of winning, for you allocate your subjective probabilities symmetrically between these two entirely unknown horses), people usually respond: 'I'd rather bet on the horses', though betting on the fair coin has evidently the highest δ 22 . This result, needless to say, falls short of constituting a scientific poll. And I feel reluctant, of course, to draw any conclusions based on anecdotal evidence. However, I find this strange. One may be tempted to argue here that rationality is not a descriptive but normative concept, and so those who prefer a bet on the horses to a bet on the fair coin are acting irrationally 23 . While I agree with this view of rationality 24 , I find this response unconvincing. Not only those who revealed an inclination for betting on the horses were (I venture to say) exemplars of the quintessence of human rationality, but also the contention itself that preferring in this case a bet on the horses is necessarily irrational is, I think, quite feeble.
Another plausible response, of course, to this puzzling situation may go along the following lines. The reliability measure δ of our subjective probabilities over the possible states of the world is a relevant factor in the assessment of expected utilities when certain pragmatic interests and concerns (such as, for example, keeping our families safe, making profits while investing our money, allocating very limited resources to scientific projects, designing reliable products and services for the customer) are being pursued but not when other pragmatic interests and concerns (such as having an enjoyable time while gambling, which does not necessarily imply making the most profit) are at stake. While, again, this looks like a plausible answer, I think that there is still something a bit unsettling about it. Are people in this example really choosing, out of two symmetrical options (i.e., the two-sided coin and the two racing horses) the one with less reliable probabilities? What if they were asked now whether, for equal prizes, they prefer to toss a fair coin or an unchecked coin? Now all the emotions we associate with horse racing are entirely eliminated. Would that make a difference? I am inclined to believe that it would -that is, people would rather bet now on the fair coin (50% chance of winning, with higher δ) over the unchecked coin (50% subjective chance of winning, with a lower δ). So, perhaps, it is not that people are willing to rationally gamble, given two or more options displaying the same probabilities, on that option which involves less reliable probabilities, as is the case of one of the horses against heads, or tails, of the fair coin, but rather that these options are not, to begin with, truly symmetrical: their utilities, besides the identical monetary prizes, are not the same.
It could also be argued here that, in any case, such strange behavior (if, of course, it is to be empirically validated) merely applies to situations where all stakes are small. In other words, it could be contended that people may occasionally be willing to bet on (say) unknown horses rather than a fair coin (all other things being equal) simply because there is not much at stake in those situations. Although this remark is, quite likely, true, I think that it does not really touch on our problem at this juncture: Can probabilities with lower δ's be rationally preferred (all other things, again, being equal) to the same probabilities with higher δ's? I believe, given the instrumental notion of rationality with which we are dealing here (for which, recall from before, the scratching of my finger cannot be of more or less import than the destruction of the entire world, as far as rationality is concerned), that any positive response, big or small, would certainly be of significance. Thus, maybe, even if the example above concerning horse racing and a fair coin is far from conclusive, the question still remains whether rationality is necessarily entangled, because of its own nature, with higher epistemic reliabilities (all other things, once again, being equal).
I will conclude with a brief description of an ongoing empirical study that, in my view, casts this idea into question 25 . Imagine a choice problem identical in all respects to Ellsberg's famous problem. An urn contains 30 red balls and, in unknown proportion, 60 black and yellow balls. One ball is taken at random. And you get to choose between two possible gambles: (i) you receive $ 10.000 if a red ball is taken and nothing otherwise; (ii) you receive $ 10.000 if a black ball is taken and nothing otherwise 26 . We leave here aside the other gambles that Ellsberg discusses in his work. The most popular gamble between (i) and (ii) among those who volunteer for the test is, famously, (i). And this is consistent with the idea that, all other things being equal, more reliable probabilities are by and large preferred, as a matter of fact, over less reliable probabilities. Now, let us imagine that we let our volunteers know that the name of this game is 'the biggest loser', loosely based on the weight loss TV show. The immediate goal now is not to win but to losevolunteers are asked to make the least money after ten rounds, and the biggest loser wins. Remember, once again, that rationality is not about the fixation of goals: it is blind as far as they are concerned. A choice cannot be deemed irrational on the simple notion that it aims at losing rather than winning. What counts is whether it gets us there, be that winning or losing. So we ask our volunteers to lose at each of the ten rounds -as people often lose at games not to embarrass friends, or to make their children happy. The subjective probability measure defined over the state of the world that corresponds to our randomly taking a red ball under gamble (i) is 1/3. And the same probability, though with a lower δ (for we have no reasons to believe that black and yellow balls are squarely distributed), corresponds to the state of the world whereby we randomly take a black ball under gamble (ii). This is why gamble (i) is generally preferred to gamble (ii) 27 , and why decision theories usually advise us to prefer the former over the latter. But the subjective probability measure defined over the state of the world that corresponds to our randomly not taking a red ball under gamble (i) is 2/3. And the same probability, but with a lower δ, corresponds to the state of the world whereby we randomly not pick up a black ball under gamble (ii). So people who play 'the biggest loser' should still prefer, and most decision theories for uncertainty and ignorance -including the one presented in this paper -would advise them to do so, gamble (i) over gamble (ii).
Preliminary results suggest that people who play this game unmistakably favour, in their rational attempt to lose, gamble (ii) over gamble (i). That is, they unmistakably favour a bet on a black ball being randomly selected over a bet on a red ball being randomly selected. This can be either interpreted as suggesting that those persons, despite all appearances, are not being truly rational, or that rationality is not necessarily accompanied by a taste for higher δ -that is, a taste for more reliable probabilities. In other words, empirical results appear to suggest that, if we accept that people playing this game are on the whole deciding rationally, then rational decisions may occasionally favour, all other things being equal, less reliable probabilities.
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